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"Decentralization" sounds wonderfully democratic. It im-
plies that people are becoming masters of their own destinies, 
freed from the oppression of distant functionaries who neither 
know nor care about the particulars of their lives. Strangely, 
however, "decentralization" can sometimes be deployed to dis-
guise oligarchic rule by an unaccountable elite. 
The paradox is starkly, if inadvertently, displayed in Profes-
sor John McGinnis's explication and defense of the Rehnquist 
Court's decisions on federalism and free association, "Reviving 
Tocqueville's America."1 Professor McGinnis argues that decen-
tralization is a central theme of the Rehnquist Court's jurispru-
dence. He claims that this idea justifies the court's work, in the 
same way that John Hart Ely's representation-reinforcement 
theory justified much of the work of the Warren Court. His at-
tempted justification fails, however, because the idea of decen-
tralization cannot be implemented in the way he contemplates 
without policy determinations that are essentially legislative. 
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1. John 0. McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville's America: The Rehnquist Court's Ju-
risprudence of Social Discovery, 90 CAL. L. REV. 485 (2002). 
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"Decentralization" thus becomes a rationalization for judicial 
oligarchy. 
This failure of justification sheds important light on the 
Rehnquist Court's work. Professor McGinnis is only the latest, if 
the most systematic, of many scholars who have defended the 
federalism and association decisions for promoting decentraliza-
tion and local control? If Professor McGinnis does not succeed 
in defending these decisions in these terms, then perhaps the 
thing cannot be done. Perhaps the Rehnquist Court's work in 
this area is not defensible at all. 
Professor McGinnis's work is a major contribution to consti-
tutional scholarship. It offers the first unified account of the ju-
risprudence of the Rehnquist Court. Professor McGinnis argues 
that the central theme of the Rehnquist Court is "decentraliza-
tion and the private ordering of social norms. "3 The over arching 
theme (though Professor McGinnis does not often use this term) 
appears to be the principle of subsidiarity, which holds that "cen-
tral authority should have a subsidiary function, performing only 
those tasks which cannot be performed at a more immediate or 
local level. "4 
2. The federalism decisions are defended in Ronald D. Rotunda, The New States' 
Rights, the New Federalism, the New Commerce Clause, and the Proposed New Abdica-
tion, 25 OKLA. CITY L. REV. 869 (2000); GrantS. Nelson and Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Re-
thinking the Commerce Clause: Applying First Principles to Uphold Federal Commercial 
Regulations but Preserve State Control Over Social Issues, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1999); 
John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311 (1997); 
Donald H. Regan, How to Think About the Federal Commerce Power and Incidentally 
Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 554 (1995); Deborah Jones Merritt, 
Commerce!, 94 MICH. L. REV. 674 (1995); and Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of 
Limited and Enumerated Powers": In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. 
REV. 752 (1995). The association decisions are defended in Michael Stokes Paulsen, 
Scouts, Families, and Schools, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1917 (2001); Dale Carpenter, Expressive 
Association and Anti-Discrimination Law after Dale: A Tripartite Approach, 85 MINN. L. 
REV. 1515 (2001); David E. Bernstein, Antidiscrimination Laws and the First Amend-
ment, 66 Mo. L. REV. 83, 126-27 (2001); and Richard A. Epstein, The Constitutional Per-
ils of Moderation: The Case of the Boy Scouts, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 119 (2000). 
3. McGinnis, supra note 1, at 489. 
4. 17 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 59 (2d ed. 1989) ("subsidiarity"). Professor 
McGinnis docs constantly refer to "decentralization," which he appears to treat as a 
synonym for subsidiarity: "Decentralization calls for public goods and services to be pro-
duced by the smallest jurisdiction that can do so efficiently." McGinnis, supra note 1, at 
489 n.ll. "Decentralization" is a less precise label for the principle that Professor 
McGinnis describes, since a determination that a small jurisdiction cannot act effectively 
would require centralization, not decentralization. Subsidiarity requires the center to act 
when local bodies are incompetent or when this is necessary to restrain "the encroach-
ment of non-government mcgastructures, the empowerment of mediating structures, and 
the facilitation of individuals' participation in societal decision-making." Robert K. 
Vischer, Subsidiarity as a Principle of Governance: Beyond Devolution, 35 IND. L. REV. 
103, 142 (2001). Vischer's article is a fine description and critique of recent conservative 
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Professor McGinnis argues that this idea of decentralization 
is the basic idea behind the Court's decisions. With respect not 
only to federalism and freedom of association but also the estab-
lishment clause and the jury, the Court's overriding concern is 
"protecting the conditions of spontaneous order so that norms 
can be discovered through competition."5 The Rehnquist Court's 
jurisprudence, he argues, "sustains a social order constructed 
from below rather than imposed by the government from 
above."6 
Professor McGinnis's ambition is to do for the Rehnquist 
Court what John Hart Ely famously did for the Warren Court: 
show that its decisions have a common theme and that this 
theme is democratically legitimate. Ely argued that the Warren 
Court's prime concern was not the undemocratic one of declar-
ing the country's fundamental values, but was rather protecting 
the integrity of the democratic process. Ely was troubled by 
Alexander Bickel's claim that "judicial review is a counter-
majoritarian force in our system," so that "when the Supreme 
Court declares unconstitutional a legislative act or the action of 
an elected executive, it thwarts the will of representatives of the 
actual people of the here and now; it exercises control, not in 
behalf of the prevailing majority, but against it. "7 Under the ju-
risprudence of the Warren Court, Ely argued, "the selection and 
accommodation of substantive values is left almost entirely to 
the political process,"8 and judicial review is concerned solely 
with "what might capaciously be designated process writ large-
with ensuring broad participation in the processes and distribu-
tions of government."9 Ely's answer to Bickel's countermajori-
tarian difficulty was to assign to the judiciary only that task with 
which the legislature cannot be trusted: "to keep the machinery 
of democratic government running as it should."10 The principal 
themes of the Warren Court, Ely thought, were preventing in-
efforts to appropriate the idea of subsidiarity. 
5. McGinnis, supra note 1, at 490. 
6. !d. at 493. Professor McGinnis frequently invokes Tocqueville as the theorist 
whose sociology guides the Rehnquist Court, but, as Nancy Rosenblum observes, Toc-
queville's "importance for contemporary American political thought is mainly inspira-
tional. Democracy in America offers no guidance on the question of government's rela-
tion to mediating institutions." NANCY ROSENBLUM, MEMBERSHIP AND MORALS 44 
(1998). 
7. ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-17 (1986). 
8. ]OH:--1 HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 87 (1980). 
9. !d. (footnote omitted). 
10. !d. at 76 
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cumbents from entrenching themselves in power and protecting 
minorities from prejudice, and both of these could be justified in 
terms of representation-reinforcement. 
Professor McGinnis thinks that the Rehnquist Court, too, 
generally avoids the countermajoritarian enterprise of declaring 
substantive values. The Rehnquist Court's jurisprudence, like 
Ely's, "can be seen as a process jurisprudence, one that seeks to 
convert the preferences of the people into social norms. "11 The 
comparison, Professor McGinnis thinks, works to the advantage 
of the Rehnquist Court: 
In fact, the Rehnquist Court's jurisprudence better filtrates 
popular sentiment than Ely's because it follows the Constitu-
tion in making use of a variety of protected structures such as 
the states, civic associations, both secular and religious, and 
juries, when these structures better achieve the goal of gov-
ernment by the people than national democracy. 12 
His aim is primarily to describe rather than to defend the 
Rehnquist Court, but he writes that "in showing its coherence 
and substantiality I necessarily suggest that the Rehnquist 
Court's jurisprudence has greater plausibility than many have 
thought. "13 
Professor McGinnis's descriptive analysis is penetrating, but 
its coherence does not give the Court's work plausibility, if that 
word indicates valid reasoning toward defensible results. It takes 
more than coherence to make something plausible. Suppose that 
the police have in their custody Fester, who has just stabbed 
three strangers on the street. They seek to account for his con-
duct. When Fester is interviewed, he explains that the CIA has 
planted a transmitter in his brain, and that the three people who 
he stabbed were all CIA agents who were operating the trans-
mitter. After he tells us this, his actions will be considerably 
more coherent to us than they were before, and we will have a 
11. McGinnis, supra note 1, at495. 
12. ld. 
13. Id. at 488 n.3. In his response to me, Decentralizing Constitutional Provisions 
Versus Judicial Oligrarchy: A Reply to Professor Koppelman, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 39, 
40 (2003) (hereinafter "Reply"), Professor McGinnis denies that he is defending the 
Court's work. He merely "note[s] some modern support" for the policies the Court is 
implementing. Reply, supra, at 40-41. Both his original article and his reply to me are, 
however, filled with enthusiasm for those policies. Some of the relevant passages are 
quoted herein. See infra notes 12, 72, 73, 99, 106, 108, and 121 and accompanying text. 
His "aspirations are similar" to "Ely's defense of the Warren Court." Reply, supra, at 59. 
For other defenses of the "misunderstandings and misstatements" of which I stand ac-
cused, see infra notes 32, 74, and 101. 
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pretty good idea of the reason for the attacks. We will not, how-
ever, conclude that his reasons were plausible ones. 
In this article, I will argue that, while the judges of the 
Rehnquist Court may possibly believe that they are facilitating 
democratic self-governance, this notion has about as much plau-
sibility as Fester's belief that the CIA has put a transmitter in his 
brain. 
Part I will explain why subsidiarity is not a justiciable prin-
ciple. Part II will explore the doctrinal pathologies produced by 
the Rehnquist Court's efforts to promote this principle. Part III 
will show that Professor McGinnis's defense of the Court's work 
relies on dubious empirical assumptions. The conclusion argues 
that a true jurisprudence of subsidiarity would look very differ-
ent from the work of the Rehnquist Court. 
I. THE NONJUSTICIABILITY OF SUBSIDIARITY 
The basic problem is that subsidiarity, which Professor 
McGinnis shows is the animating principle of the Rehnquist 
Court's jurisprudence, is a principle that the judiciary is ill suited 
to enforce in any but the weakest fashion. Deciding which topics 
are apt for decentralization is an inescapably political judgment, 
and judges cannot adjudicate such questions without imposing 
their own political views on the rest of us. 
It is impossible to disentangle the question of an institu-
tion's capacities from that of what we want the institution to do. 
The fact that an institution tends to make good decisions is good 
reason to judge it competent. The fact that an institution tends to 
make bad decisions is good reason to judge it incompetent. (Of 
course, in both cases we must be able and authorized to distin-
guish good decisions from bad ones.) We have institutions for 
reasons, and we judge the institutions by how well they serve our 
reasons for having them. 14 
This entanglement of institutional capacity with goodness 
entails three reasons why the enforcement of subsidiarity re-
quires inescapably political judgments. 
First, and most importantly, no legal authority can help 
judges to determine which collective ends are worth pursuing. 
14. Professor McGinnis accurately observes that I "offer[] no framework for assessing 
circumstances in which centralization of norm creation is better than decentralization." 
Reply, supra note 13, at 41. My claim is that no such general framework, separate from 
particular judgments about good decisions, can exist. 
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That is an ultimate value judgment about which the Constitution 
is largely silent, and so is an appropriate object of democratic de-
liberation. Critics of Ely have correctly noted that representation-
reinforcement depends on substantive value judgmentsY But the 
value judgments that underlie Ely's theory-that it is important 
for citizens to have an effective vote, that minorities should not 
suffer because of prejudice against them-are a good deal less 
controversial than the ones that enforcement of subsidiarity 
would need to rely on. Who decides whether the federal gov-
ernment has a more legitimate interest in economic than in 
noneconomic matters? Whether federal law should address en-
dangered species, or the draining of wetlands, or cloning human 
beings? Which kinds of discrimination should be prohibited? 
Which kinds of association are so valuable as to be worthy of 
protection? The answers to these questions are not procedural. 
They are the stuff of substantive politics. As Robert Dahl ob-
serves, control over the agenda is one of the central criteria for 
determining whether a decisionmaking process is democratic.16 
Second, even if judges know what ends ought to be pursued, 
they have a very limited ability to compare the capacities of in-
stitutions to pursue those ends. They do not have comparative 
data, nor have they any way to obtain such data. If they try to 
decide such matters, their political biases inevitably rush to fill 
the vacuum. This problem has led courts in Europe to be wary of 
deciding subsidiarity questions even when they were given much 
clearer constitutional authorization than the Supreme Court has 
gotten. In the face of a clear textual mandate, the German Con-
stitutional Court has often declined to consider whether federal 
15. See, e.g., Laurence Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitu-
tional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980). 
16. ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 112-14 (1989). Rehnquist 
himself once articulated this concern well: 
How is this Court to divine what objectives are important? ... I would have 
thought that if this Court were to leave anything to decision by the popularly 
elected branches of the Government, where no constitutional claim other than 
that of equal protection is invoked, it would be the decision as to what govern-
mental objectives to be achieved by law are "important," and which are not. 
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,221 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Similarly, Justice 
Antonin Scalia writes that subsidiarity is not a "principle of law" in the United States, but 
only "a desideratum of policy." Even as an "aspiration rather than a legal rule," subsidi-
arity "deserve[s) a place alongside such other unquestionably true and indubitably un-
helpful propositions as 'do good and avoid evil' and 'buy low and sell high."' Antonin 
Scalia, Subsidiarity a I'Americaine: C'est a Dire Preemption, in MAASTRICHT, 
SUBSIDIARITY AND ITALIAN-EC RELATIONS 4, 4 (1992), quoted in George A. Bermann, 
Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and the United 
States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 331, 447 n.464 (1994). 
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legislation is "necessary," holding that "necessity" is a matter for 
legislative discretion. 17 Similarly in the European Union, where 
the principle of subsidiarity is expressly relied on by the Maas-
tricht Treaty, the principle is enforced in only the most general 
terms.18 To date the European Court of Justice has resisted sug-
gestions that the principle is non-justiciable, but has "showed a 
certain lack of enthusiasm for examining whether it had in fact 
been respected," leading commentators to conclude that "the 
Court is likely to allow the Community legislature a wide discre-
tion in areas which involve policy choices. "19 
Chief Justice Rehnquist understands this furoblem. A quar-
ter century a5o, dissenting in Craig v. Boren, 0 he opposed the 
requirement that a sex-based classification be substantially re-
lated to important government objectives, arguing that this test 
"requires courts to make subjective judgments as to operational 
effects, for which neither their expertise nor their access to data 
fits them."21 But judgments about operational effects is precisely 
what the principle of subsidiarity calls for. 
Finally, judges can't assess when a local level that is quite 
capable of doing the right thing nonetheless lacks the political 
will to do it properly. Subsidiarity reserves decisionmaking to the 
lowest level that can act effectively. There is no reason in princi-
ple why the Southern states could not have acted to prevent 
lynchings during the Jim Crow period. Nonetheless, the principle 
of subsidiarity did not require the federal government to stand 
by and permit those lynchings to continue.22 
17. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF 
GERMANY 43-46 (1994). "The Basic Law was recently amended to make clear that the 
question was justiciable, but it remains to be seen whether the horse can be made to 
drink." David P. Currie, Subsidiarity, 1 GREEN BAG 2d 359, 364 n.35 (1998) (citation 
omitted). 
18. The difficulty of judicial enforcement is exacerbated by the fact that the treaty's 
two mentions of the principle seem to point in opposite directions, with one emphasizing 
devolution and the other aiming at efficiency. See John Peterson, Subsidiarity: A Defini-
tion to Suit Any Vision?, 47 PARL. AFF. 116, 120 (1994). 
19. ANTHONY ARNULL, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS COURT OF JUSTICE 551 
(1999); for similar views sec ANTHONY ARNULL, ET AL., WYATT AND DASHWOOD'S 
EUROPEAN UNION LAW 162 (4th ed. 2000); TREVOR C. HARTLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROBLEMS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 86-88 (1999); Paul D. Marquardt, Subsidiarity and 
Sovereignty in the European Union, 18 FORDHAM !NT'L L.J. 616,630 (1994). 
20. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
21. !d. at 221 (Rchnquist, J., dissenting). 
22. David Currie, however, thinks that the Civil War Amendments represent "an 
exception" to the principle of subsidiarity, "a decision to override state autonomy in the 
interest of a moral imperative that the states could have effectuated had they wished." 
Currie, Subsidiarity, supra note 17, at 360 n.4. Our disagreement is perhaps simply a se-
mantic one, since Currie would doubtless agree that, if subsidiarity is construed to pre-
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These concerns about judicial overreaching that troubled 
Rehnquist so much when he was younger have evaporated with-
out explanation now that he and his like-minded colleagues are 
running the Court.23 
II. THE PATHOLOGIES OF DECENTRALIZATION 
The central cases upon which Professor McGinnis relies are 
the Court's decisions concerning federalism and freedom of as-
sociation.24 With respect to each of them, the Court's decisions 
have not been decentralizing at all. They have concentrated 
discretionary political power in the Court itself. 
A. FEDERALISM 
Begin with federalism. The principle of subsidiarity, as Cur-
rie observes, "is the guiding principle of federalism in the United 
States"25 and has been so from the beginning.26 At Philadelphia, 
the Convention nearly paraphrased the subsidiarity principle 
when it resolved that Congress could "legislate in all cases to 
which the separate States are incompetent, or in which the har-
elude federal intervention against lynching, it is to that extent an unattractive principk. 
On either interpretation, since the principle is either bounded or redefined by the Civil 
War Amendments, it is a fundamental mistake to interpret those amendments narrowly 
in the name of subsidiarity, as the Supreme Court has done. 
23. "Lord Acton did not say, 'Power tends to purify."' Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,981 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
24. Professor McGinnis also discusses the Court's decisions concerning religion and 
the jury, but these arc less important here, because they arc less related to the judicial 
enforcement of subsidiarity. It should be noted, though, that in its religion jurisprudence, 
the Rehnquist majority has been statist rather than libertarian. see Michael W. McCon-
nell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115 (1992), and seems tempted 
to relax establishment clause restrictions in a way that could facilitate a religious trium-
phalism that would be the opposite of decentralization. See Andrew Koppelman, Secular 
Purpose, 88 VA. L. REV. 87, 93, 159-60 (2002). Moreover, the vagueness o[ the idea of 
subsidiarity, see infra text accompanying notes 28-41, suggests that one could make a 
"subsidiarity" claim on behalf of almost any rule that the Court adopted in this area. H 
the Court had stopped enforcing Establishment Clause principles altogether, this result 
could have been defended by arguing that civil peace is best served by allowing Louisiana 
and Massachusetts to have broadly differing approaches to religious issues. See Steven D. 
Smith, Unprincipled Religious Freedom, 7 J. Co:-<TEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 497, 500-01 
(1996). The jury may be a wonderfully democratic institution, but the Rchnquist Court 
has done nothing to slow its practical disappearance. Almost all criminal cases are dis-
posed o[ by plea bargaining in which the jury plays no role. Fewer than [our percent of 
adjudicated felony defendants are tried by a jury. Stephanos Bibas, How Apprendi Af-
fects Institutional Allocations of Power, 87 IOWA L. REV. 465,465 (2002). 
25. Currie, Subsidiarity, supra note 17, at 359. 
26. This is true even though, as George Bermann has emphasized, there is no insti-
tutional mechanism for enforcing subsidiarity, or even for making sure that subsidiarity is 
considered in policymaking. Bermann, supra note 16, at 403-448. 
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mony of the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of 
individual Legislation. "27 This was then translated by the Com-
mittee of Detail into the present enumeration of powers in Arti-
cle I, § 8, which was accepted as a functional equivalent by the 
Convention without much discussion.28 The text of the Constitu-
tion thus appears to reflect the idea of subsidiarity, but does not 
directly impose it as an enforceable constraint on the federal 
government. 
The limits of federal power were not much tested until the 
late nineteenth century, when the federal government for the 
first time attempted to regulate the national economy. For some 
decades thereafter, the Court laid down stringent limitations on 
the more open-ended grants of power to Congress, notably the 
power "to regulate Commerce ... among the several States. "29 
This effort collapsed during the New Deal, however, when the 
pressure of economic catastrophe empowered President Roose-
velt to undertake unprecedented national regulation. The Court 
resisted at first, but capitulated after Roosevelt was reelected by 
a landslide in 1936.3° For more than half a century thereafter, the 
Court made no attempt to enforce limitations on congressional 
power. By the time I took the bar in 1991, my bar review lec-
turer31 advised us that the operative rule was easy to remember: 
Congress can do anything it wants to under the commerce 
clause?2 
This state of affairs may seem to be in considerable tension 
with the Constitution's structure. The federal government is one 
of limited and enumerated powers, and as Chief Justice John 
Marshall observed, "[t]he enumeration presupposes something 
not enumerated. ,m 
27. Quoted in JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN 
THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 177 (1996). 
28. ''Though it has been argued that this action marked a crucial, even subversive 
shift in the deliberations, the fact that it went unchallenged suggests that the committee 
was only complying with the general expectations of the Convention." /d. at 178. 
29. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 3. For an overview of the limitations, see PAUL BREST 
ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS 
355-69 (4th ed. 2000). 
30. See generally 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 
255-382 (1998) 
31. John Jeffries, now the dean of the University of Virginia School of Law. 
32. McGinnis, Reply, supra note 13, at 48, misunderstands the point of this illustra-
tion. I am not claiming that these expectations were the law. The point is rather that, 
even with this facially absurd rule, the Constitution's purpose of limiting federal power 
was not frustrated. Renewed judicial activity was not necessary. 
33. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824). 
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Yet federalism has somehow survived the revolution of 
1936.34 The Court has repeatedly insisted that Congress could 
not displace state tort law, contract law, criminal law, or family 
law,35 but these pronouncements were dictum because Congress 
never tried to take over these areas. "Congress may have had au-
thority to regulate pretty nearly everything, but it did not do 
so. "36 Moreover, some of the areas in which Congress has inter-
vened-antitrust, labor law, campaign finance, environmental 
law-are ones in which the principle of subsidiarity demands in-
tervention from the center in order to empower local mediating 
institutions?7 Subsidiarity is not merely a principle of devolution, 
and the claim that it is silently discards the principle and substi-
tutes for it a far cruder and less attractive one. The idea is to 
empower individuals, not just to weaken the center.38 From the 
standpoint of subsidiarity, the New Deal settlement doesn't look 
all that bad.39 State and local officials have complained about the 
burden of federal regulation, but, George Bermann notes, they 
typically seek, not a broad curtailment of that regulation, but 
"specific operational remedies" such as "greater flexibility in the 
administration of federal programs, less 'red tape,' fewer condi-
tions on federal grants in aid, few if any 'unfunded mandates,' 
and much more generous federal financial support to state and 
local governments. "40 
Nonetheless, the Court has now decided that there must be 
judicially enforceable limits to Congressional power. In 1995 in 
United States v. Lopez,41 the Court for the first time since the 
34. Professor McGinnis may be correct that "the system of enumerated powers that 
sustained constitutional federalism was dead," McGinnis, supra note 1, at 511, but feder-
alism itself was not. 
35. See 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 913-14 (3d ed. 
2000). 
36. Currie, Subsidiarity, supra note 17, at 361. Currie notes that there is no federal 
code "even of corporations or commercial law, although there never could have been any 
doubt of Congress's authority to regulate commerce among the states." !d. 
37. Vischcr, supra note 4, at 127-42. 
38. See id., passim. 
39. It doesn't look so bad from the standpoint of economics, either. McGinnis, su-
pra note 1, at 509, suggests that the original design facilitated the emergence of the 
United States as an economic superpower by the beginning of the twentieth century. He 
docs not try to explain why, after the judiciary stopped enforcing limitations on Congress 
in the 1930s, the American economy did not collapse. 
40. Bcrmann, supra note 16 at 433. The last item on this list shows how far the 
states arc from wanting a mere shrinkage of the federal government. States will cheer-
fully pass on to the federal government the task of raising revenues, which when shared 
with states allows them to provide a higher level of public services than they could if they 
had to compete with each other by lowering taxes. 
41. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
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New Deal held that a statute exceeded Congress's powers. The 
statute in Lopez was a pretty easy one from the standpoint of 
subsidiarity, criminalizing possession of handguns near schools-
an issue that there was no reason to think that the states couldn't 
deal with perfectly well.42 The law in Lopez appears to have 
been an attempt to score cheap political points by appearing 
tough on a pressing and difficult problem without contributing 
anything substantial to its solution. 
The Lopez Court did not however say that it was relying on 
the principle of subsidiarity. For the reasons already outlined, 
that principle is not directly enforceable. The same objection 
could perhaps be made about any substantive theory of constitu-
tional law, stated at a very high level of generality.43 Ely's "rep-
resentation-reinforcement" model, for example, was not directly 
enforced by the Warren Court, which relied on legal rules that 
served as proxies for the underlying theory, such as "one person 
one vote" or the doctrine of suspect classifications. The 
Rehnquist Court has similarly found some proxies for subsidiar-
ity, such as the limitations it has crafted under the Tenth 
Amendment,44 the Eleventh Amendment,45 and its rule of avoid-
ance based on the commerce clause.46 The large and unrepair-
able gap in this enterprise is, however, the commerce power it-
self. None of the doctrinal limits that it has been toying with is 
workable. 
The field of constitutional interpretation is a contentious 
one, and disagreement about fundamentals is a familiar phe-
nomenon. Nonetheless, all of the various schools share the fol-
lowing minimal presumption: 
Any legal rule that the Court devises must provide a basis for 
decisionmaking that is narrower than determining what is, all 
things considered, the best thing for government to do. 
Unless this constraint is respected, the judicial function becomes 
indistinguishable from the legislative one. There is no evidence 
that the Court will devise a rule for restraining the commerce 
power that does not violate this constraint. 
42. See Regan, supra note 2, at 569. 
43. Thanks to Tom Merrill for raising this objection. 
44. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 
u.s. 144 (1992). 
45. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 
517 u.s. 44 (1996). 
46. See Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army 
Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001); United States v. Jones, 529 U.S. 848 (2000). 
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The Lopez Court noted that Congress had made no findings 
on the regulated activity's impact on the national economy.47 
Later cases however made clear that the "findings" prong was 
makeweight, since it would be ridiculously easy for Congress to 
enhance its power by reciting appropriate findings. 48 
The Court also thought it important that the activity in-
volved was traditionally subject to state regulation.49 The trouble 
with this as a test is that the "traditional state concern" test was 
already tried by the Court when it sought to immunize states 
from federal law in National League of Cities v. Usery,50 and 
eventually collapsed under the wei~ht of tradition's indetermi-
nacy as a basis for rules of decision.5 There is no reason to think 
it will be more coherent here. 
Finally, the Lopez Court thought it relevant that Congress 
was trying to regulate noneconomic activity,52 and more recently 
the Court suggested that this was the crucial distinction.53 But 
this test would deprive Congress of all authority over such non-
trivial matters as the spoliation of the environment. The Court 
has already suggested on this basis that Congress may not have 
the power to regulate wetlands that are wholly within a single 
state. 54 
The most far-reaching test now contemplated by any of the 
justices is Justice Thomas's proposal that "commerce" be under-
stood to include only "selling, buying, and bartering, as well as 
47. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at562·63. 
48. See especially United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,614-15 (2000). 
49. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564. Justice Kennedy's concurrence, which provided the 
crucial fifth vote for the majority, suggested that tradition was the crucial factor. Ken· 
nedy was reluctant to compromise "the stability of our Commerce Clause jurisprudence 
as it has evolved to this point," /d. at 574 (Kennedy, J., concurring), and he was parlicu· 
larly troubled by this law because it "seeks to intrude upon an area of traditional state 
concern." /d. at 580. 
50. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
51. Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 SUP. Cr. 
REV. 125, 194-206; Regan, supra note 2, at 566. Some of the judges on the present Court 
seem unpersuaded that tradition is indeterminate, see, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 
U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) (opinion of Scalia, 1., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.); but these same 
judges have not attempted to revive the National League of Cities test, instead using 
other means to immunize the states. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
52. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561. 
53. "While we need not adopt a categorical rule against aggregating the effects of 
any noneconomic activity in order to decide these cases, thus far in our Nation's history 
our cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity only where that 
activity is economic in nature." Morrison, 529 U.S. at613. 
54. Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps of 
Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001). 
2003] DECENTRALIZATION AND OLIGARCHY 23 
transporting for these purposes,"55 and that Congress should 
therefore be understood to have no power over productive ac-
tivities such as manufacturing and agriculture.56 Thomas's ap-
proach suffers from all the difficulties of indeterminacy and per-
verse results that bedevil almost any form of originalism.57 It is 
possible that Thomas is correct about the framers' intent, but 
this is only because because most of the framers envisioned a far 
smaller central government than the one we (along with every 
other modern industrialized nation) now have.58 A judicial deci-
sion attempting to dismantle the modern administrative state 
would be a constitutional revolution that the framers never 
imagined, and which most of the justices are unwilling to impose. 
That revolution would go considerably beyond subsidiarity, be-
cause it would disable the Federal government from undertaking 
even some tasks that the states are obviously incapable of under-
taking separately. 
The Rehnquist Court's commerce power decisions, a lead-
ing treatise observes, "invite challenges to countless federal 
laws."59 What is Congress's power to, say, protect the environ-
55. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 585 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
56. See id. at 584-602; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627-28 (Thomas, 1., concurring). It is 
not clear what one should call Thomas's willingness to tear down long-established institu-
tions on the basis of an abstract and untested theory, but "conservatism" seems the 
wrong label. See Thomas W. Merrill, Bark v. Burke, 19 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 509 
(1996). Professor McGinnis appears to think that this kind of revolution from above 
would be consistent with decentralization. See McGinnis, supra note 1, at 517. In his re-
ply, his emphasis shifts from decentralization to textualism and originalism, and he takes 
me to task for not developing my own theory of interpretation. Reply, supra note 13, at 
40. I cannot develop one here, but can easily identify our broader disagreement: I think 
that not only text, original intent, and precedent, but also settled practice and prudence, 
are sources of constitutional meaning. These claims have been well developed by others. 
See PHILIP BOBBIIT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE (1982); David Strauss, Commmon Law 
Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1996). Professor McGinnis's pro-
fessed indifference to consequences would be more convincing were he not so obviously 
pleased by the anticipated consequences of the Rehnquist Court's innovations. 
57. See generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 
13-25 (2001); see also H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659 
(1987). (Professor McGinnis complains that I "make[] no serious attempt to show" 
originalism's indeterminacy, Reply, supra note 13, at 48 n.45, but this has already been 
done by Fallon and Powell.) Thomas's originalism is constrained somewhat by his reli-
ance on precedent, see Lopez at 601 n.8, but this carries us right back into the realm of 
unconstrained discretion, since his originalism cannot determine where he should rely on 
precedent and where he should ignore it. 
58. See GrantS. Nelson & Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Rethinking the Commerce Clause: 
Applying First Principles to Uphold Federal Commercial Regulations but Preserve State 
Control Over Social Issues, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1999). Nelson and Pushaw, it should be 
noted, find this ancient straitjacket more comfortable than I do. 
59. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 267 
(2d ed. 2002). 
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ment? What is to be the fate of the Endangered Species Act, or 
the federal regulation of wetlands? The doctrine the Court has 
contemplated is either indeterminate or dictates politically im-
possible results. 
The Court might resolve the problem in the way that the 
European Court has: by enforcing the principle of subsidiarity 
only when the contested act "has been vitiated by manifest error 
or misuse of powers, or whether the institution concerned has 
manifestly exceeded the limits of its discretion. "60 But this way of 
reading the law leaves to the legislature most of the work of 
looking after the principle.61 The Rehnquist Court has shown lit-
tle inclination to go down that road. As Larry Kramer has 
shown, the Rehnquist Court has sometimes been willing to craft 
new constraints on federal power, unsupported by text or prece-
dent, solely in order to maintain its own monopoly on constitu-
tional interpretation.62 
The Court's interventions into Congress's exercise of the 
commerce power have so far been fairly modest, involving only a 
couple of fairly minor statutes. But if the Court goes no further, 
then the program of decentralization that Professor McGinnis 
describes will not be substantially advanced. 
The basic dilemma for the Court, assuming it understands 
its mission in the way Professor McGinnis describes, is that if it 
applies a deferential standard of review, then it will only invali-
date trivial grandstanding legislation like that at issue in Lopez, 
and thus it will not play any significant rule in determining the 
balance of power between the federal government and the 
states. On the other hand, if it takes an aggressive role, then the 
constitutionality of any federal statute will depend on whether 
the judges regard it as a good idea that ought to have been en-
acted. 
60. ARNULL, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS COURT OF JUSTICE, supra note 19, 
at 551 (quoting United Kingdom v. Council, Case C-84/94 [1996] ECR 1-5755, 'I 58). An-
other possibility would be to police the legislative process to make sure that Congress 
thinks seriously about the merits of disrupting the existing federal-state balance. See 
Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking Constitutional Federalism, 74 TEX. L. REV. 795 (1996). 
No Justice has indicated any interest in moving doctrine in this direction. 
61. Donald Regan, perhaps the most prominent defender of subsidiarity as a prin-
ciple for determining the scope of federal power, acknowledges this. Regan, supra note 2, 
at 559. 
62. See Larry Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term-Foreword: We the Judges, 
115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 143 (2001). 
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B. SECTION 5 OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
The clearest evidence that the Court means to be aggres-
sive, even if this means that it must effectively act as a third 
house of Congress, is its recent decisions interpreting section 5 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, which have repeatedly invalidated 
recently enacted federal laws. The original purpose of the 
Amendment was to authorize Congress to act against discrimina-
tion, and the framers would have been surprised to learn that the 
Amendment meant to affirm that "this Court has had primary 
authority to interpret [the Constitution)."63 The Court now 
comes close to holding that any attempt by Congress to exercise 
its section 5 power will be subject to strict scrutiny.64 The 
Rehnquist Court evidently does not like the section 5 power and 
regards its exercise with deep suspicion. Professor McGinnis's 
theory, that the Court is enforcing subsidiarity, offers a helpful 
explanation for this suspicion: the principle of equal citizenshig 
is not a principle of subsidiarity, and is deeply in tension with it. 5 
But if this is correct, then to read the Fourteenth Amendment 
through the lens of subsidiarity is to eviscerate it. In so doin~, the 
Court is seizing the power to revise the Constitution itself, 6 de-
63. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 524 (1997); see Michael McConnell, 
Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 
153, 181-85 (1997). In light of Professor McGinnis's professed originalism, it is surprising 
that he ignores this devastating originalist objection in both his California article and his 
reply. Originalism is often indeterminate, see supra note 57, but it is clear enough to ex-
clude the Court's claims of exclusive interpretive authority. 
64. Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimina-
tion Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 477 (2000); see also 1 
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 35, at 959 ("Laws enacted by 
Congress pursuant to § 5 [have] suddenly been saddled with something between inter-
mediate and strict scrutiny .... "). Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 
721 (2003), which upheld the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, is anomalous. "Al-
though Hibbs refers time and again to the pervasive harms of sex stereotyping, it never 
demonstrates a pattern of violations that a court would find violates Section 1 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment." Robert C. Post, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: 
Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 17-18 (2003). A contrary decision would 
have jeopardized the very popular Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (made appli-
cable to state governments by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972). See id. 
at19-24. Chief Justice Rehnquist, who wrote Hibbs, also had personally encountered the 
problem the FMLA addressed. His daughter "is a single mother who until recently held a 
high-pressure job and sometimes had child-care problems. Several times this term, the 
78-year-old Chief Justice of the United States left work early to pick up his granddaugh-
ters from school." Linda Greenhouse, Evolving Opinions, Heartfelt Words from the 
Rehnquist Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2003, sec. 4, p. 3 . 
. 65. This point was emphasized by Jack Balkin. But see supra note 22 and accompa-
nymg text. 
66. At one point, Professor McGinnis also succumbs to this temptation, suggesting 
that the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Amendments were mistakes. McGinnis supra note 1, 
at 511. If the centralizing tendencies that he deplores have been written into the Consti-
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leting those provisions that are inconsistent with its own vision of 
the appropriate role of the federal government. 
The breadth of the discretion that the Court has assumed is 
clearest in Board of Trustees of University of Alabama v. 
Garrett,67 which invalidated the Americans With Disabilities 
Act's authorization of suits against the states. The Court held 
that discrimination on the basis of disability could never be a 
constitutional violation, because the Court had previously held 
that, when challenged in court, such disability would be subject 
to minimal scrutiny. Since the Court had declined to intervene 
on behalf of the disabled, the states "could quite hardheadedly-
and perhaps hardheartedly- hold to job-qualification require-
ments which do not make allowance for the disabled. "68 Justice 
Breyer, dissenting, observed that the earlier refusal to subject 
disability discrimination to heightened scrutiny was based on the 
Court's recognition that "addressing the problems of the 'large 
and diversified group' of persons with disabilities 'is a difficult 
and often a technical matter, very much a task for legislators 
guided by qualified professionals and not by the perhaps ill-
informed opinions of the judiciary. "'69 These institutional limita-
tions are obviously not shared by Congress. "To apply a rule de-
signed to restrict courts as if it restricted Congress' legislative 
power is to stand the underlying principle- a principle of judicial 
restraint- on its head. "70 The holding implies that the list of sus-
pect classifications the Court has declared-and it has not de-
clared a new one in nearly thirty years-is exhaustive.71 There is 
no unjust discrimination in the world that has not been found 
and remedied by the Court-or more precisely, if any new 
wrong is to be remedied, that may only be done when it is a 
wrong that troubles the Court.72 Professor McGinnis observes 
tution, then to that extent he is proposing to revise rather than to interpret the document. 
67. 531 u.s. 356 (2001). 
68. !d. at 367-68. 
69. Id. at 384 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living 
Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 442-43 (1985)). 
70. !d. at 385 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
71. On the trajectory of modern equal protection doctrine toward a closed system 
in which no additional forms of discrimination can receive heightened scrutiny, see EVAN 
GERSTMA!"N, THE CONSTITUTIONAL UNDERCLASS: GAYS, LESBIANS, AND THE 
F AlLURE OF CLASS-BASED EQUAL PROTECTION 1-56 (1999). 
72. Professor McGinnis cites with approval the Court's refusal to protect "classes 
that are not suspect classifications under the Fourteenth Amendment," McGinnis, supra 
note 1, at 514 n.l43 and Reply, supra note 13, at 52, 53, but docs not seem to notice that 
suspect classes are neither a natural kind nor enumerated in the Constitution. Somebody 
has to decide what they arc. The Court's section 5 jurisprudence is predicated on the as-
sumption, which Professor McGinnis does not defend, that it is the ultimate repository of 
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that "the Court has moved decisively to create a sphere of pri-
vate noneconomic activity untouchable by national regula-
tions,"73 but he does not pause to notice that the "private none-
conomic activity" that is "untouchable by national regulations" 
includes rape and lynching.74 
C. FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 
Finally, there is freedom of association. The leading case is 
now Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 75 which held that the Boy 
Scouts of America had a constitutional right to exclude a gay 
scoutmaster. Professor McGinnis defends this decision, but he 
does not attempt to state the rule of law that the opinion lays 
down. 76 Nor could he do so without embarrassment, for the rules 
that the opinion relies on are absurd ones that the Court cannot 
possibly mean. According to the Dale majority, "[a]n association 
must merely engage in expressive activity that could be im?aired 
in order to be entitled to [First Amendment] protection." 7 The 
Court must give deference to an organization's assertions re-
garding the nature of its expression, and "we must also give def-
erence to an association's view of what would impair its expres-
wisdom on this question. 
73. !d. at515. 
74. Professor McGinnis contends that "this sentence does no work other than to 
cast innuendoes on both the Court and my theory of the Court," Reply, mpra note 13, at 
51 n.58, and presumably it is one of my "misstatements." But these were the local activities 
that the Court protected from federal interference in Morrison and the post-
Reconstruction cases. I did not make it up. Professor McGinnis now writes that if states 
are failing to prevent these crimes, of course the federal government should have the 
power to intervene. /d. at 51. But that is just what Congress was trying to do, and was 
prevented from doing, in these cases. Here as elsewhere, Professor McGinnis is more 
admirable than the Court he is defending. Morrison goes considerably beyond the post-
Reconstruction cases it cites (which were themselves egregious enough) by implying that 
even if (as the post-Reconstruction Court pretended not to know) the Southern states 
were tolerating lynchings of blacks, Congress still had no power to criminalize lynching, 
because the murderers were not state actors. Post & Siegel, supra note 64, at474-77. 
75. 530 u.s. 640 (2000). 
76. The closest he comes to doing so is to note that the Court "tested the constitu-
tionality of the statute by inquiring not into the state's interest in preventing discrimina-
tion against homosexuals, but into the burden on BSA's expressive rights ... " That is to 
say, it purported to engage in a balancing test without inquiring at all into what was on 
the other side of the scales. McGinnis, supra note 1, at 536. Professor McGinnis correctly 
observes that I do not engage his own theory of freedom of association. Reply, supr~ 
note 13, at 51-53. But Dale does not rely on anything like that theory. It also does not 
mention the limitations that he offers. The Court's opinion is simply an ipse dixit. Profes-
sor McGinnis is correct that I ought to address his theoretical claims, and I do so else-
where. See Andrew Koppelman, Should Noncommercial Associations Have an Absolute 
Right to Discriminate?, L. & CO~·.:TEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 2004). 
77. Dale, 530 U.S. at 655. 
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sion. "78 This reasoning implies that all antidiscrimination laws 
are unconstitutional in all their applications, since any discrimi-
nator might claim that its expression is impaired by the applica-
tion of the law. Other parts of the opinion, which argue that ad-
mitting an unwanted member is compelled speech that would 
require the Scouts to endorse a message with which they dis-
agree,79 imply that citizens are allowed to disobey laws whenever 
obedience would be perceived as endorsing some message.80 
Obviously, the Court does not really intend to establish ei-
ther of these rules of law.81 What really seems to be driving the 
decision is the Court's implicit judgment that the Boy Scouts of 
America is especially worthy of judicial protection, or that gay 
people are especially unworthy of legislative protection, or 
both.82 How is the Court to decide in future cases which groups 
are particularly worthy or which kinds of discrimination are in-
adequate to justify legislation? Apparently on the basis of its 
own political views. There is nothing else that it could possibly 
rely on.83 
The decision has little to do with empowering small, local 
associations.84 The Boy Scouts of America is a colossus, with an 
78. /d. at 653. 
79. "Dale's presence in the Boy Scouts would, at the very least, force the organiza-
tion to send a message, both to the youth members and the world, that the Boy Scouts 
accepts homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior." /d. 
80. The analysis offered iA this paragraph is developed in detail in Andrew Kop-
pelman, Signs of the Times: Dale v. Boy Scouts of America and the Changing Meaning of 
Nondiscrimination, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1819 (2002). At one point, Professor McGinnis 
acknowledges the potential breadth of Dale, suggesting that it implies the correctness of 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), since "[s]chooling is an expressive activity." 
McGinnis, supra note 1, at 557 n.383. This principle would entail that parents have a right 
not to educate their children at all, and to prevent anyone else from educating them. 
81. Richard Epstein, who would love to be able to say that all antidiscrimination 
laws are unconstitutional, cannot bring himself to claim that Dale so held. See Richard 
Epstein, The Constitutional Perils of Moderation: The Case of the Boy Scouts, 74 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 119 (2000). 
82. Both judgments are dubious. On the worthiness of the Boy Scouts, see Andrew 
Koppelman, Are the Boy Scouts Being as Bad as Racists? Judging the Scouts' Antigay 
Policy, PUB. AFF. Q. (forthcoming 2004). On the appropriateness of protecting gays from 
discrimination, see ANDREW KOPPELMAN, THE GAY RIGHTS QUESTION IN 
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN LAW 6-34 (2002); ANDREW KOPPELMAN, 
Al'TIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND SOCIAL EQUALITY 146-76 (1996). 
83. The Court's Lochner-like arrogation to itself of the power to review the need-
fulness of state antidiscrimination legislation sheds unflattering light on its decisions in-
terpreting section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which purport to hold that the power 
to define impermissible discriminatory conduct is reserved to the states. See Jed 
Rubenfeld, The Anti-Antidiscrimination Agenda, 111 YALE L.J. 1141 (2002). 
84. Berger and Neuhaus, who originated the concept of mediating structures, have 
warned against the kind of misuse to which it is put here: . . . . 
On the Right, the concept was understood as mcludmg all mstnuuons out-
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endowment of $2.2 billion,85 $155 million in revenues in 1998 and 
an o~erating surplus of $17.1 million,86 and three million mem-
bers. 7 The Dale decision has been used by the BSA to crush lo-
cal dissenters (who would have been protected by antidiscrimi-
nation statutes of the kind the Court invalidated) by expelling 
troops that refuse to discriminate against gays.88 This is not de-
centralization. 89 
D. A MUTED TRUMPET? 
Now it is possible that both Professor McGinnis and I are 
exaggerating the Court's ambitions. The commerce clause cases 
have thus far struck down two very minor statutes that had little 
effect. The section 5 cases primarily involve the somewhat ab-
struse Eleventh Amendment issue of whether Congress can pro-
vide for suits by private parties against state governments. Most 
antidiscrimination legislation involves economic transactions, 
and so can be sustained under the present understanding of the 
commerce power. The rule of constitutional avoidance based on 
the commerce clause leaves open the possibility of Congres-
sional reenactment with clear intent. And with respect to other 
federalism questions, such as preemption or the dormant com-
merce clause, the Court has not shown any increased deference 
to state prerogatives.90 In short, it is possible to regard the 
side government, which, of course, stretches the concept beyond any usefulness. 
Neither General Motors nor the United Methodist Church is a mediating struc-
ture, though a workshop within a GM plant might be, as might a local Method-
ist congregation. As a matter of fact, even a local government agency might 
have a meaningful relationship with the values of the people it serves. Not every 
nongovernmental organization is a mediating structure. 
Peter L. Berger & Richard John Neuhaus, Peter Berger and Richard John Neuhaus Re-
spond, in TO EMPOWER PEOPLE: FROM STATE TO CiVIL SOCIETY 145, 149 (Michael No-
vak ed., 2d. ed. 1996). 
85. This includes cash and deferred gifts. See <http://www.scouting.org/nav/enter. 
jsp?s=mc>. 
86. Chuck Sudetic, The Struggle for the Soul of the Boy Scouts, ROLLING STONE, 
July 6-20,2000, at 101,106. 
87. The 2000 Annual Report of the Boy Scouts of America reported a total mem-
bership of 3,351,969. The 2001 Annual Report (rel1ecting, perhaps, negative publicity in 
the wake of Dale) does not state the total membership, but provides figures on Cub 
Scouts and Boy Scouts that add up to 3,049,070. The 2002 report's total is 3,011,269. See 
<http://www.scouting.org>. 
88. The Scouts have revoked the charters of some local branches that refused to 
follow the national antigay policy. See, e.g., Lisa Black & Courtney Challos, Charters of 7 
Cub Packs Not Renewed by Boy Scouts, Oak Park Anti-Bias Code Conflicts With Na-
tional Policy, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 26, 2001, at 3. 
89. For an argument that freedom of association should be construed more nar-
rowly than the Court construed it in Dale, see Koppelman, supra note 76. 
90. See McGinnis, supra note 1, at 526 n.203 (noting the Court's centralizing pre-
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Court's federalism jurisprudence, not as the opening trumpet of 
the New Jerusalem, but as pathetic grandstanding.91 
This objection may be correct. Only time will tell. On the 
other hand, Professor McGinnis has amassed considerable evi-
dence that the Court contemplates a revolution, and the Court 
seems, at least occasionally, to have the nerve to carry it out. The 
fact that it has not happened yet is comforting. So is the fact that 
there has not yet been a nuclear conflict between India and 
Pakistan. In both cases, the comfort has its limits. 
III. JUST SO STORIES 
Professor McGinnis, whose intellectual honesty considera-
bly exceeds that of the Court he admires, repeatedly acknowl-
edges that the judicial interventions he defends must rely on 
guesswork. "[S]pecial interests ... may be able to exercise politi-
cal power out of proportion to their numbers to obtain resources 
and status for themselves; "92 "more decentralized democracy 
could offer a way to discover better social regimes; "93 "sexual re-
straint may be a positive norm for society"94 and "a religious 
structure may be necessary"95 to support it; noneconomic asso-
ciations "may in fact be important counterweights to narrower 
economic interests. "96 All of these things could be true. But why 
should the Court's hunches govern the rest of us? 
emption jurisprudence); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The "Conservative" Paths of the 
Rehnquist Court's Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 462·63 (2002) (during 
the 1999 and 2000 terms, the Court found for preemption in every preemption case it 
heard). Fallon thinks these cases reveal that the Court is animated less by federalism 
than by substantive conservatism. "Because federal preemption eliminates state regula-
tory burdens, preemption rulings have a tendency-welcome to substantive conserva-
tives-to minimize the regulatory requirements to which businesses are subject." Jd. at 
471. Similarly, Justices O'Connor and Kennedy abandon their concern for states' rights 
in the dormant commerce clause cases because their substantive conservatism leads them 
to read into the Constitution "antiregulatory, procompetitive ideals." Jd. Federalism ide-
als are most evident in an array of subconstitutional devices, such as "judge-made equi-
table doctrines, pro-federalism principles of statutory construction, and official immunity 
rules," that make it "exceedingly difficult-even when not constitutionally impossible-
for private plaintiffs to recover money damages from state and local governments and 
their officials." /d. at 437. 
91. This objection was raised by Tom Merrill. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Making 
of the Second Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary Analysis, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 569 (2003). 
92. McGinnis, supra note 1, at 503 (emphasis added). 
93. /d. at 504 (emphasis added). 
94. /d. at 506 (emphasis added). 
95. /d. (emphasis added); see also id. at 546. 
96. Jd. at 542 (emphasis added). 
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Professor McGinnis sufgests that the Court's decisions re-
flect "the spirit of its age,"9 "the political ideas and ideals of its 
era,"98 and that "[t]he Rehnquist Court's jurisprudence reflects a 
more skeptical view of centralized democracy in an era in which 
there is more elite skepticism about the prospects of nationally 
mandated social reform than existed in the eras of the New Deal 
and the Great Society. "99 "Skepticism about highly centralized 
government as a rational planner of broad social reform has 
grown because the Great Society's reforms are widely believed 
to have had certain counterproductive consequences. "100 
This is silly. Perhaps a sane person could think that Social 
Security, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the National 
Labor Relations Act, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion, Medicare, Medicaid, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Vot-
ing Rights Act of 1965, and the Fair Housing Act of 1968 are all 
counterproductive failures. 101 But this hardly describes any pre-
sent consensus. The skepticism that Professor McGinnis calls 
characteristic of the modern age is actually only dominant in the 
right wing of the Republican Party, a faction whose ideas are 
widely regarded as loony and dangerous. 
To some extent, Professor McGinnis is right that decentrali-
zation reflects the spirit of the age. It is sometimes reflected in 
the actions of elected officials. 102 A Court that finds it necessary 
to repeatedly strike down recently enacted statutes, however, is 
not merely reflecting the ideas of its time. It is taking one side of 
a very live political dispute and throwing its weight into the bal-
ance. 
The basic problem is identical to that of the Lochner court. 
In Lochner, in deciding whether the state had met its burden of 
showing that the police power could be exercised, the court nec-
essarily relied on its own notions of reasonableness: it balanced 
the liberty sacrificed, which was given very great weight, against 
the public interest that was served. The balancing technique 
cannot be carried out without the judge's own views determining 
97. !d. at 489 n.l 0. 
98. !d. at 498. 
99. !d. at 490. 
100. !d. at 502. 
101. Here is another of my "misstatements": Professor McGinnis points out that 
many of these are New Deal, not Great Society, programs. Reply, supra note 13, at 45. 
But the first of the two sentences I just quoted lumps the two together and cites "skepti-
cism" about both. 
102. Professor McGinnis notes, for example, that "Congress largely has returned 
welfare policy back to the states." McGinnis, supra note 1, at 525. 
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the weight given to each of the factors. The trouble with Lochner 
is that under it, the judges' task of assessing the constitutionality 
of legislation became indistinguishable from that of a legislator 
deciding whether to vote for the law. 103 And the same is true of 
the federalism and association cases: the decisions turned on 
whether the judges thought the law was a good idea. 
Nor is there any reason to feel confident of the Court's 
judgments. Professor McGinnis claims that "[m]odern political 
science has suggested that mass national democracy often pro-
duces legislation that neither reflects majority will nor is effi-
cient, since special interests dominate legislators while most citi-
zens are rationally ignorant of the salient political issues. "104 But 
this theory's predictions are disconfirmed by much of modern 
regulation, which often does resist capture and pursue the public 
interest. 105 Professor McGinnis fears that government tends to 
engage in "excessive regulation and wasteful spending on behalf 
of interest groups,"106 and of course some of that does go on. But 
the classic tales of government waste that are repeatedly cited in 
the media have been proven apocryphal.107 Discerning which 
government measures are wasteful is a quintessentially political 
judgment that cannot be reduced to any legal standard. 
The case for radical decentralization also depends on a gid-
dily romantic view of the states. Professor McGinnis suggests 
that judicially enforced federalism will "temper strategic behav-
ior and substitute in its place the genuine concern of one citizen 
for another."108 When people make decisions at the state level, 
apparently, no one is ever mean to anyone else and we're in the 
land of milk and honey. But, of course, all that really happens 
when the federal government is disabled is that politics gets dis-
placed from one forum to another, thereby generating a differ-
ent set of winners and losers. Decentralization may even end up 
promoting oligarchy, since local elites get less attention and less 
103. And, of course, the Lochner court was political all the way down, rationaliza-
tions to the contrary notwithstanding. Professor McGinnis thinks that Lochner reflects 
"the reigning laissez-faire theories of the day," McGinnis, supra note 1, at 499, but of 
course if these theories were really "reigning" there would have been no statute for the 
Lochner Court to invalidate. Other Americans in the same period had very different vi-
sions of constitutionallibcrty. See generally William E. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal 
Citizenship, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1999). 
104. McGinnis, supra note 1, at 490; see id. at 502-04. 
105. Steven P. Croley, Public Interested Regulation, 28 FLA. ST. L. REV. 7 (2000). 
106. McGinnis, supra note 1, at 509. 
107. See Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 YALE. L.J. 
1981 (1998). 
108. McGinnis, supra note 1, at 510. 
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monitoring by the press and public interest watchdog groups 
than national elites do. 
Consider the case of Texas. The policies of the state reflect 
very different priorities from those of the federal government, 
and from those of most other states. Texas ranks last among the 
states in per capita general government revenue and expendi-
tures, forty-fifth in per capita public welfare spending (despite 
ranking sixth in the percentage of population in poverty), second 
in the percentage of the population without health insurance, 109 
forty-fifth in per capita spending on environmental programs, 
and forty-ninth in the average monthly benefit per participant in 
the Women, Infants, and Children Program.110 
These choices did not represent the triumph of local democ-
racy against a homogenizing center. Texas politics, in which both 
political parties are dominated by conservatives, is crucially de-
pendent on the ability of moneyed elites to control the political 
system. In primaries, contributors of $500 or more "gave almost 
90 percent of their aggregate donations to conservatives, putting 
most of that into the races of conservative Democrats, in order 
to prevent the nomination of a liberal." 111 In Texas elections, the 
highest spenders almost always win,112 and liberals have always 
been outspent by conservatives-in races in the 1960s, "usually 
by a factor of two. "113 A key element of conservative control has 
been the ability to hold down voting turnout, particularly among 
the working class. The ideology of Texans who are eligible to 
vote is barely distinguishable from that of eligible voters in lib-
eral states such as Minnesota and Illinois.114 The crucial differ-
ence is the underrepresentation of the liberals' natural constitu-
ency in the electorate. 115 The conservatives' shrewdest response 
to the voting rights reforms of the 1960s was the decision in 1972 
to move gubernatorial elections to years in which there were no 
109. KENDRA A. HOVEY and HAROLD A. HOVEY, CQ'S STATE FACT FINDER 2002: 
RANKINGS ACROSS AMERICA 398-99 (2002). 
110. These last figures are taken from the state's own web page. See 
www.window.state.tx.uslcomptrol!wwstand/wwstand.html (visited July 26, 2002). 
Ill. CHANDLER DAVIDSON, RACE AND CLASS IN TEXAS POLITICS 140 (1990). 
112. /d. at 134. "In 1998, the candidates who won seats in the legislature collectively 
outspent their losing opponents by $25.6 million to $5.7 million." NEAL TANAHILL, 
TEXAS GOVERNMENT: POLICY AND POLITICS 174 (7th ed. 2002). "Most states restrict 
the amount of money individuals and groups can contribute to candidates for office, but 
not Texas." /d. Republicans outspend Democrats by a considerable margin. /d. at 142. 
113. DAVIDSON, supra note 111, at 137. 
114. /d. at 39. 
115. Seeid. at 17-39. 
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presidential contests, which slashed turnout by a third. 116 Race is 
also a powerful force in Texas politics. Racial division continues 
to prevent the formation of an effective working class party. 
Even after the abolition of the poll tax, efforts to prevent blacks 
from voting continue, sometimes involving the dispatch of white 
poll watchers into black precincts and the dissemination of false 
information to convince the uneducated that going to the polls 
could lead to arrest for voting fraud. 117 
Nonetheless, Texas elites have lost some important fights. 
Blacks are now allowed to vote. The poll tax has been abolished. 
Even though the legislature cut off all spending on workplace 
safety, and even abolished funding for collecting reliable job in-
jury and illness data/ 18 there is some regulation of dangers in the 
workplace. Race and sex discrimination in employment have 
been outlawed. Social Security prevents poverty among the eld-
erly, and Medicare, Medicaid, Head Start, and Legal Aid pro-
vide services for the poor. 
Every one of these measures, however, were "primarily the 
result of federal intervention-often over the fierce resistance of 
the conservative-dominated state and local governments." 119 
Texans such as Lyndon Johnson and Ralph Yarborough played 
an important role in these developments. But they accomplished 
what they did by enlisting the federal government to give them 
what they could not get out of the local legislature. Federal in-
tervention did not crush local initiative. It tempered the worst 
116. /d. at 53-55. Even in presidential contests, though, turnout is low. In the No-
vember 2000 election, Texas ranked 48th in the percentage of population voting. HOVEY 
AND HOVEY, CO's STATE FACf FINDER 2000, supra note 109, at 113. "Not once in the 
twentieth century has a majority of the total voting-age population of Texas gone to the 
polls in a single election." DAVIDSON, supra note 111, at 113. See also TANAHILL, supra 
note 112, at 91-97 (documenting low turnout). Tanahill notes that poor adults are far less 
likely to vote in Texas than in the average state, and concludes that this effect 
is the legacy of the state's long history of public policies designed to limit the 
right to vote to middle-class and upper-income white people .... Parents who 
could not vote were unable to serve as participation role models for their chil-
dren. Adult Texans who grew up in households with adults who could not vote 
are less likely to participate politically than arc citizens who were raised in fami-
lies that participated in the political process. 
/d. at 97. 
117. DAVIDSON, supra note 111, 235-36; see also Laughlin McDonald, The New Poll 
Tax, AM. PROSPEcr, Dec. 30, 2002; John B. Judis, Soft Sell: Can the GOP Convince 
Blacks Nor ro Vote?, NEW REPUB., Nov. 11,2002. 
118. DAVIDSON, supra note 111, at 122. The need for such data collection is shown 
by continuing, vigorous efforts by large Texas businesses to prevent workers from secur-
ing truthful information about the dangerousness of their jobs. See id. at 118-20. One 
might usefully write a study, parallel to the present one, of how "libertarianism" rational-
izes force and fraud. 
119. /d. at 247. 
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excesses of one of the most pitiless and greedy ruling classes in 
the country. 120 Texas is an extreme case, but it shows the ex-
tremes of which states are capable absent federal intervention. 
Professor McGinnis claims that decentralization is sup-
ported by "[t]he best recent scholarship,"121 but there is no rea-
son to think that the judges are even aware of this scholarship. 
What seems to the judges to be the "spirit of the age" is more 
likely to be the conventional wisdom of the conservative maga-
zines and radio shows that they and their friends consume. 122 The 
prospect of being ruled by this crowd of insular, ignorant man-
darins is pretty scary. Of course, they're confident that they're 
promoting decentralization and democracy. But Fester is equally 
confident that he's got that transmitter in his brain. 
120. Seeid. at 198-220. 
121. McGinnis, supra note 1, at 509 n.105. Specifically, Professor McGinnis responds 
to the familiar "race to the bottom" rationale for uniform federal standards by claiming 
that the "best recent scholarship" indicates that "there will not generally be a race to the 
bottom, absent interjurisdictional spillover effects." !d. For this proposition he cites only 
Richard L. Revesz, Rehabiliraring lntersrare Comperirion: Rethinking rhe "Race-ro-rhe-
Bouom-Rarionale" in Environmental Regularion, 67 N Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992). Revesz 
claims, on the basis of an abstract economic model unsupported by empirical evidence, 
that abandoning federal environmental standards would promote benign competition 
among the states that "can be expected to produce an efficient allocation of industrial 
activity among the states." !d. at 1212; see also Richard L. Revesz, The Law and Econom-
ics of Federalism: The Race ro rhe Bouom and Federal Environmental Regulation: A Re-
sponse to Crirics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 535 (1997). Revesz's article has produced numerous 
critical responses, which offer considerable empirical and theoretical evidence that the 
race to the bottom is a reality, and that the likely consequence of Revesz's proposal 
would be massive increases in pollution, with no compensating increase in welfare. See, 
e.g., Douglas R. Williams, Cooperative Federalism and rhe Clean Air Act: A Defense of 
Minimum Federal Standards, 20 ST. LOUIS U. Pt..:B. L. REV. 67 (2001); Scott R. Saleska & 
Kirsten H. Engel, "Facts Are Stubborn Things": An Empirical Reality Check in the Theo-
retical Debare Over the Race-To-The-Bouom in State Environmental Standard Setting, 8 
CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 55 (1998); Franz Xaver Perrez, The Efficiency of Coopera-
rion: A Functional Analysis of Sovereignty, 15 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 515 (1998); 
Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a "Race" and Is It "To 
the Bouom?", 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271 (1997); Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Continuing Impera-
tive (But Only From A Narional Perspective) for Federal Environmental Protection, 7 
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 225 (1997); Peter Swire, The Race to Laxity and the Race ro 
Undesirability: Explaining Failures in Competition Among Jurisdictions in Environmental 
Law, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 67 (1996); Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental 
Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570 (1996). 
122. The Justices, Professor McGinnis notes, "pick up the outlines of broad social 
theories as they are reflected in the media." McGinnis, supra note 1, at 499. In Plato's 
theory, the guardians had more reliable means of access to Truth than this. In some 
moods, Professor McGinnis is acutely conscious of the judges' limitations. See id. at 566. 
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CONCLUSION 
Ely responded to the Lochner problem by confining judges 
to procedural questions, and leaving substantive questions to the 
legislature. The difference between Rehnquist's Constitution 
and Ely's is starkly illustrated by the difference between Bush v. 
Gore123 and the Warren court case it relied upon, Reynolds v. 
Sims,124 which may be the paradigmatic Elyan case. In the 2000 
election the only elite that was manipulating the process to keep 
itself in power was the Republican-dominated Supreme Court. 
Representation-reinforcement theory hardly entails that the 
Court install in the White House the loser of the popular vote, 
whose narrow Florida majority crucially depended on the delib-
erate disenfranchisement of black voters. 125 
Professor McGinnis writes about the need to generate 
norms "from below," but there are numerous candidates for the 
title of "below": the business or the worker endangered by un-
safe conditions in a job that pays starvation wages, the manufac-
turer or the consumer, the state employer or the disabled em-
ployee, the state criminal justice system or the raped woman, the 
discriminator or the person seeking an apartment or a job, the 
lynch mob or its victim. The Court's decisions do not delegate 
these determinations to discovery machines. Rather, the Court 
itself decides which aspects of the status quo should not be inter-
fered with by federal power. 
What Professor McGinnis's paean to local control loses 
sight of is that the best discovery machines of all are people-
individuals who want to take control of their own lives and who 
can be oppressed by local as well as by national elites. And peo-
ple are less effective discovery machines when they are inade-
quately nourished, homeless, denied medical care, denied oppor-
tunities because of their race or sex, or poisoned or mutilated on 
the job. The undefended preference for local elites is starkest 
when Professor McGinnis claims that the jurisprudence he de-
scribes is inconsistent with the Court's protection of fundamental 
rights, because, for example, "a right to abortion does not em-
power a discovery machine that helps us find social norms."126 
On the contrary, the right to abortion makes the decision about 
123. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
124. 377 U.S. 533 (1964), quoced in Bush, 531 U.S. at 105. 
125. See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Underscanding che Conscicucional 
Revolucion, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045,1046-49 (2001). 
126. McGinnis, supra note 1, at 565-66. 
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what norms ought to govern the abortion question more decen-
tralized than any other rule of law could. There are as many de-
cisionmakers as there are pregnant women. A rule of law that 
forces women to have babies, on the other hand, is a pretty se-
vere constraint on their ability to craft norms of their own. 127 
As noted earlier, the Court hasn't done that much yet with 
this federalism jurisprudence. The judges have claimed the 
power to decide what the federal government may try to accom-
plish, to predict what means are necessary to those ends, to de-
cide which inequalities are just and not to be touched by Con-
gress, and which associations are specially protected. What 
restrains them isn't doctrine (which they have made indetermi-
nate), but their own prudence and common sense. Bush v. Gore 
shows that these are exceedingly weak reeds on which to rely. 
Mexico has just triumphantly cast aside a corrupt political sys-
tem in which the holders of power got to choose their successors. 
The U.S. Constitution gives no such power to Supreme Court 
justices, but they have seized it and evidently have gotten away 
with it. Maybe we will need to get used to being ruled by them, 
in the same way that citizens of Zimbabwe had better get used to 
being ruled by Mugabe, or the Iranians to rule by the ayatollahs. 
But to claim that the Rehnquist Court's innovations stand for 
democratic legitimacy and the protection of local control is to 
declare one's love for Big Brother. The Court's "decentraliza-
tion" jurisprudence is a series of abuses of power, with promise 
of worse. It is not decentralization. It is not democracy. 
127. See Andrew Koppelman, Forced Labor: A Thirteenth Amendment Defense of 
Abortion, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 480 (1990). Professor McGinnis thinks that I have here un-
dercut the rest of my critique, since I support judicial intervention when the uncnumer-
ated rights in question are ones that I like. Reply, supra note 13, at 55-58. But he does not 
engage or even mention the detailed arguments from text, original intent, and precedent 
that I develop in my abortion article. (And he elsewhere chides me for paying no atten-
tion to these sources of law.) He claims that I think judges ought to decide issues of clon-
ing and assisted suicide, neither of which I have ever addressed. Actually, my views of 
substantive due process doctrine arc skeptical and not all that different from his. See 
KOPPELMAN, THE GAY RIGHTS QUESTJOl', supra note 82, at 35-52. 
